

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 06127 01 OF 05 121532Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 06127

FOR EUR/CE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PGOV WB

SUBJECT: SPRING QUADRIpartite MEETING: DRAFT ASSESS-
MENT OF BERLIN SITUATION

REF: STATE 79101

BEGIN SUMMARY. THIS TELEGRAM PROVIDES A STATUS REPORT, FOR THE INFORMATION OF EUR/CE, ON THE DRAFTING OF PAPERS FOR THE OSLO QUADRIpartite MEETINGS, AND TRANSMITS THE TEXT OF THE FIRST DRAFT OF A BERLIN ASSESSMENT. THE BONN GROUP ASSESSMENT, WHEN FINALLY AGREED, MIGHT ALSO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A BERLIN BRIEFING IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FRG FONOFF, HAVING ELICITED THE ASSISTANCE OF BERLIN OFFICIALS AS WELL, HAS DRAFTED A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT (20 PAGES PLUS STATISTICAL CHARTS) OF THE BERLIN SITUATION AND PRESENTED IT TO ALLIED REPS IN THE BONN GROUP. FRG REP (LUECKING) SAID THE PAPER WAS CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BONN 06127 01 OF 05 121532Z

PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE US REQUEST, AS ELABORATED

BY DEPARTMENT OFFICERS TO FRG EMBASSY WASHINGTON, FOR A FULL AND BALANCED ASSESSMENT.

2. THE FRG PAPER IS TOO LONG FOR USE AS A BRIEFING PAPER FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS, AND ALLIED REPS HAVE THEREFORE AGREED IT WOULD NOT BE WORTHWHILE TO ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE ON IT TO MAKE IT A BONN GROUP PAPER. RATHER, THEY HAVE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO THE FRG REP AND HAVE SAID THEY ARE TRANSMITTING IT TO CAPITALS FOR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. THE FRG DRAFT DOES CONTAIN USEFUL DATA, AND WE ARE SENDING A TRANSLATION IN AIRGRAM FORM.

3. BOTH US AND FRENCH REPS HAVE PREPARED FIRST DRAFTS OF WHAT MIGHT BECOME THE ASSESSMENT WHICH THE BONN GROUP WAS ASKED TO PREPARE AT THE DECEMBER QUADRIPARTITE MEETING AND CONCERNING WHICH THE DEPARTMENT MADE PROPOSALS IN REFTTEL. AN ATTEMPT HAS NOW BEEN MADE TO MERGE THE TWO DRAFTS, AND THE COMBINED PAPER WILL BE TABLED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE FULL BONN GROUP ON APRIL 13. THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CHANGES BEFORE A FINAL BONN GROUP DRAFT EMERGES (THE UK REP INSISTS, AS HE DOES SEMI-ANNUALLY, THAT FIVE PAGES IS TOO LONG FOR MINISTERS), BUT WE ARE CABLING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT US-FRENCH DRAFT FOR WHATEVER PRELIMINARY COMMENTS THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO MAKE.

4. THE BONN GROUP HAS HAD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE SENIOR LEVEL AND MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND WILL CONTINUE WORK ON DRAWING UP AN AGENDA ON APRIL 13. IN ADDITION, ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRESENTING A BRIEFING TO THE NAC WILL BE DISCUSSED. OUR PRESENT THOUGHT IS THAT THE ASSESSMENT PREPARED BY THE BONN GROUP FOR THE MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE FOUR MIGHT SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE NAC BRIEFING AS WELL (WITHOUT, HOWEVER, THE EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR IMPROVED ALLIED/FRG CONSULTATIONS THAT PRESENTLY APPEARS IN PART II OF THE US/FRENCH DRAFT).

5. TEXT OF THE US/FRENCH DRAFT FOLLOWS:
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PAGE 03 BONN 06127 01 OF 05 121532Z

BEGIN TEXT

BERLIN: AN ASSESSMENT

I. THE SITUATION

A. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

ECONOMIC

BY MOST ECONOMIC INDICATORS, THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN BERLIN IS FAVORABLE. STATISTICS FOR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, INVESTMENTS, PRODUCTIVITY, AND

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PAGE 01 BONN 06127 02 OF 05 121534Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 06127

UNEMPLOYMENT ALL COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH THOSE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THE RELATIVE STABILITY OF THE BERLIN ECONOMY IN RECENT YEARS IS IN LARGE MEASURE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION FLOWING FROM THE QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT. WITH ACCESS UNIMPEDED, ECONOMIC DECISIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY BERLIN'S LOCATION ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT DISTANCE BETWEEN MANUFACTURER AND CONSUMER IS INVOLVED -- A DISADVANTAGE WHICH IS FULLY COMPENSATED BY ECONOMIC PREFERENCES.

TO ENSURE CONTINUED ECONOMIC PROGRESS, TWO FUNDAMENTAL SHIFTS, WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY NECESSITATED BY

THE PROJECTED DECLINE IN WEST BERLIN'S POPULATION, WILL
BE REQUIRED: TO MORE CAPITAL-INTENSIVE INDUSTRY, AND
TO MORE PRODUCTION FOR USE OUTSIDE OF BERLIN.

TWO OTHER FACTORS WILL REMAIN INDISPENSABLE FOR A
FAVORABLE ECONOMIC SITUATION:

-- THE MAINTENANCE OF A POLITICALLY QUIET
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PAGE 02 BONN 06127 02 OF 05 121534Z

SITUATION; AND

-- FULL INTEGRATION IN THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, FULL ACCESS TO THE EC,
AND CONTINUATION OF SUBSIDIES AND TAX PRIVILEGES.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPINION POLLS HAVE SHOWN GROWING CONCERN AMONG
BERLINERS OVER THE SERIOUSNESS OF BERLIN'S POLITICAL
SITUATION IN RECENT MONTHS; HALF THE RESPONDENTS HAVE
CHARACTERIZED THE BERLIN SITUATION AS "VERY SERIOUS" OR
"RATHER SERIOUS." IN PART, THESE RESULTS SUGGEST WIDE-
SPREAD DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE FACT THAT THE BERLIN
AGREEMENTS DID NOT SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS. RECENT
DETERIORATION IN PUBLIC SENTIMENT MAY ALSO BE
EXPLAINED BY PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS THAT SOVIET POLICIES
TOWARDS BERLIN HAVE BECOME MORE RIGID IN RECENT MONTHS.

DESPITE THESE CONCERNS, THE POLLS ALSO INDICATE
THAT BERLINERS IN 1975 INCREASINGLY FELT THAT LIFE IN
BERLIN HAD BECOME MORE WORTHWHILE SINCE THE CONCLUSION
OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENTS. ALMOST HALF THE RESPONDENTS
IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE CONSIDERED THAT SUCH POLITICAL
PROBLEMS AS SOCIAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND
INTERNAL SECURITY DESERVED PRIORITY OVER THE PROBLEMS
OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CONFIDENCE OF BERLINERS IN THE
PROTECTION OF THE THREE POWERS AS GUARANTORS
OF THEIR FREEDOM REMAINS HIGH.

REASSURANCE THAT BERLIN WILL REMAIN FIRMLY A PART
OF THE WEST IS PROBABLY THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL MEANS OF
MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING A FAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CLIMATE. REAFFIRMATION OF THE ALLIED COMMITMENT AND
OF BERLIN'S TIES TO THE WEST IS IMPORTANT, AS IS THE
CONTINUED FIRM REJECTION OF EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO FOSTER
A "THIRD STATE" CONCEPT.

POLITICAL

IMPROVEMENTS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE QUADRIPARTITE
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PAGE 03 BONN 06127 02 OF 05 121534Z

AGREEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT INNER-GERMAN AGREEMENTS HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO A GREATER NORMALCY IN THE POLITICAL
SITUATION NOW THAN IN ANY OTHER PERIOD SINCE 1945.

GREATER EASE OF ACCESS MEANS THAT BERLINERS TRAVEL
MORE FREQUENTLY AND MORE FREELY (PRIVATE TRIPS BY
CAR IN 1975 WERE ALMOST TWICE THOSE IN 1971).

BERLIN'S REPUTATION AS A CITY OF INTERNATIONAL
FAIRS AND CONGRESSES HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED, AND THE
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS IN BERLIN HAS STEADILY
INCREASED SINCE 1973 -- ALTHOUGH SOVIET OBJECTIONS
HAMPER THE DEVELOPMENT OF BERLIN AS A MEETING POINT
FOR EAST AND WEST.

THE TIES BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC REMAIN STRONG, AND AN ACTIVE FEDERAL PRESENCE
IS A VISIBLE, POLITICAL FACT OF LIFE -- DESPITE SOVIET
EFFORTS TO WEAKEN THE TIES.

B. EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

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PAGE 01 BONN 06127 03 OF 05 121536Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 06127

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR HAVE NOT ABANDONED THEIR PRINCIPAL LONG-TERM GOAL FOR BERLIN -- TO SEPARATE THE CITY FROM THE WEST AND INCORPORATE IT INTO THE GDR. EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL WERE IN A SENSE INTERRUPTED BY THE QA, BUT THERE HAS BEEN PERCEPTIBLE ACTIVITY IN RECENT MONTHS AIMED AT HASTENING THE WAY STATION TO THAT LONG-TERM GOAL, THE CREATION OF A "THIRD STATE" STATUS FOR THE CITY. THE METHODS USED BY THE TWO DIFFER TO SOME EXTENT.

1. SOVIET TACTICS

THE SOVIET UNION USES TWO DIFFERENT TACTICS FOR ACHIEVING ITS AIM:

(A) IT PRESSES FOR THE NARROWEST POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE QA, AND SEEKS TO HAVZ THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE FRG ACCEPT THIS INTERPRETATION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE AREA OF MAINTAINING AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BONN 06127 03 OF 05 121536Z

DEVELOPING THE TIES BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FRG -- WHERE THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THAT THE STIPULATION THAT BERLIN IS NOT A PART OF THE FRG TAKES PRECEDENCE -- AND IN

MATTERS OF REPRESENTATION BY THE FRG OF THE INTERESTS OF BERLIN ABROAD. HERE, THE SOVIETS TRY TO GIVE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION TO THE CONCEPT OF "STATUS AND SECURITY" -- AREAS TO WHICH THE FRG RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION DOES NOT EXTEND. THIS SOVIET ATTITUDE COULD BECOME AN ELEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN THE FUTURE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE APPLICATION IN BERLIN OF EC TREATIES.

(B) IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE TRIED TO USE FRG-SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS TO INDUCE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO ACCEPT A REGIME FOR BERLIN DIFFERENT FROM THAT PROVIDED FOR IN THE QA. SUCCESS IN THIS EFFORT, WHICH AIMS AT GIVING THE SOVIET UNION A GREATER

VOICE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WESTERN SECTORS OF BERLIN, COULD RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO SETS OF PRINCIPLES FOR BERLIN. ONE, CAREFULLY CONTROLLED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD APPLY IN BERLIN'S RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN WORLD AND, ESPECIALLY, WITH THE FRG; THIS WOULD BE THE REGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE QA, OF WHICH THE THREE POWERS ARE GUARANTORS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS. THE OTHER WOULD APPLY IN BERLIN'S (AND THE FRG'S) RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC; THE USSR WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS DEFINITION AND, USING THE BILATERAL LEVERAGE WHICH IT COULD APPLY IN ITS DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, WOULD THEREBY BESTOW ON ITSELF THE ROLE OF A FOURTH POWER IN WEST BERLIN.

2. GDR TACTICS

THE GDR, ACTING DISCREETLY BUT EFFICIENTLY, HAS GRADUALLY ASSUMED A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN BERLIN AFFAIRS, PRIMARILY THROUGH THE VEHICLE OF INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS.

(A) THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GDR, COMPLEMENTARY TO THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, HAVE BEEN ORIENTED TOWARD
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PAGE 03 BONN 06127 03 OF 05 121536Z

A DEVELOPMENT OF ITS OWN "TIES" WITH BERLIN. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE DECEMBER 1975 TRANSIT ARRANGEMENTS, THE NUMEROUS PROPOSALS FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE SENAT, AND THE PRACTICE OF NOTIFYING THE SENAT OF AGREEMENTS WHICH HAVE IN PRINCIPLE BEEN CONCLUDED WITH THE FRG, ALL SHOW THAT THE GDR IS METHODICALLY -- AND NOT WITHOUT SUCCESS -- APPLYING ARTICLE VII OF THE 1975 GDR-USSR TREATY.

(B) WHETHER DELIBERATELY OR NOT, THE GDR SEEMS ALSO TO BE CREATING THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CONFUSION OVER THE SHARING OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN BERLIN (AS BETWEEN THE THREE POWERS, THE SENAT, AND THE FRG ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GDR AND THE USSR ON THE OTHER HAND). IT THEREBY HOPES, PERHAPS, THAT THIS CONFUSION WILL GRADUALLY EXTEND TO FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS CONCERNING THE STATUS AND SECURITY OF THE CITY.

II. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

THE BREAKING-IN PERIOD IN THE FIRST YEARS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE QA, WHEN BOTH SIDES PROBED TO FIND THE OUTER LIMITS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GAINS FROM THE QA AND

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PAGE 01 BONN 06127 04 OF 05 121536Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 06127

TO LEARN POSITIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE, HAS ESSENTIALLY ENDED. THE LINES ON WHICH THE SOVIETS AND THE GDR WILL PURSUE THEIR LONG-TERM AIMS HAVE BECOME RATHER CLEAR. THE POSITIONS THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO ADVANCE IN RECENT MONTHS RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY ARE MOVING INTO A MORE ACTIVE PHASE OF ATTEMPTING TO EXPLOIT THE SO-CALLED "GRAY AREAS" OF THE QA.

THE STIFFENING IN THE SOVIET POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN NOTED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS COULD LEAD TO MORE SERIOUS CONFRONTATIONS IF THERE SHOULD BE A WEAKENING OF THE WESTERN POSITION OR IF THERE SHOULD BE SERIOUS SETBACKS TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS WHICH DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION IN THIS CONNECTION.

A. BERLIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE EC WILL PROBABLY BE THE MAJOR SOURCE OF DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE FUTURE.

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PAGE 02 BONN 06127 04 OF 05 121536Z

DESPITE THE SPECIAL REGIME WHICH WILL BE APPLIED FOR BERLIN, IT MUST BE EXPECTED THAT THE EXTENSION TO BERLIN OF THE CONVENTION ON DIRECT ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WILL PRECIPITATE A SEVERE QUARREL WITH THE SOVIETS.

OTHER COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS WILL ALSO BE BONES OF CONTENTION -- ADOPTION OF EUROPEAN PASSPORTS, AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EEC AND COMECON, EXPANSION OF POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, AND PROGRESS IN GENERAL TOWARD "EUROPEAN UNION."

ASIDE FROM THEIR HISTORICAL DISLIKE FOR THE EC, THE SOVIETS ARGUE THAT BERLIN IS ILLEGALLY INCLUDED IN THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF THE EC TREATIES. ARGUING THAT THE SUPRANATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE EC CLEARLY AFFECT MATTERS OF STATUS, THE SOVIETS IN FACT FEAR THE INCORPORATION OF BERLIN, STEP BY STEP, IN A SOVEREIGN ENTITY WHICH WOULD "RULE" IF NOT GOVERN THE CITY, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SYSTEM FROM WHICH THE USSR IS EXCLUDED.

WHILE THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE NO PLAN OF ACTION AT PRESENT FOR INTERRUPTING BERLIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EC, THEY ARE CLEARLY LAYING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH A FUTURE CONFRONTATION MIGHT BE CAST. FOR THIS REASON, AND BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WEST BERLIN ENJOY MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION IN THE EC CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, BERLIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EC WILL REMAIN AN AREA REQUIRING SPECIAL ATTENTION ON THE PART OF THE FOUR.

B. BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONSTITUTE A VEHICLE FOR GDR PRESSURE ON THE THREE POWERS AND THE FRG. PROBLEMS WHICH AROSE THIS WINTER (CONCLUSION OF THE DECEMBER 19 TRANSIT AGREEMENTS AND THE REICHSBAHN AFFAIR) COULD RECUR, FACING THE FOUR AGAIN WITH CERTAIN DILEMMAS:

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PAGE 03 BONN 06127 04 OF 05 121536Z

-- WHETHER IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE, IN CERTAIN

CIRCUMSTANCES, TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS NOT
ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY, RATHER THAN NO AGREEMENT AT ALL;

-- WHETHER, ONCE SUCH AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN
CONCLUDED, THE WESTERN SIDE SHOULD RENOUNCE CERTAIN
PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF BERLINERS IN
ORDER TO PROTECT POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE, WHEN THE
IMPORTANCE OF THOSE PRINCIPLES IS NOT ALWAYS EVIDENT.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT ANY CONCESSIONS
MADE IN BERLIN TO THE GDR ARE, BY THEIR VERY NATURE,
OF CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE. WHILE EACH CONCESSION
COULD BE, IN AND OF ITSELF, OF LIMITED IMPORTANCE, THE
DANGER LIES IN THE BELIEF OF THE GDR THAT, BY OFFERING
AGREEMENT ON MATTERS TO WHICH THE FRG LEGITIMATELY
ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE, IT COULD QUESTION ALLIED
RIGHTS AND LEAD THE THREE POWERS TO ACCEPT COMPROMISES.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE
THREE AND THE FRG COULD LEAD EITHER TO A WEAKENING OF

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PAGE 01 BONN 06127 05 OF 05 121539Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03

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THE ALLIED POSITION IN BERLIN OR TO PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FOUR, WHICH ALSO WOULD LEAD TO A WEAKENING OF THE WESTERN POSITION.

COORDINATION AMONG THE FOUR POWERS HAS WORKED WELL IN DECISIONS ON MATTERS OF FEDERAL PRESENCE IN BERLIN. CAREFUL ATTENTION TO POLITICAL AS WELL AS LEGAL FACTORS HAS DEPRIVED THE SOVIETS OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEGITIMATE COMPLAINT ABOUT ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD.

REALIZING THAT FURTHER REAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE BERLIN SITUATION MAY COME ABOUT PRIMARILY THROUGH INNER-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS, THE FOUR MUST STRIVE TO ACHIEVE AN EQUALLY GOOD RECORD FOR COORDINATION IN THAT FIELD AS WELL.

C. CONCLUSION

VIEWED IN LONGER-RANGE TERMS, THERE ARE TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ENSURING THAT THE WESTERN CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BONN 06127 05 OF 05 121539Z

POSITION IN BERLIN REMAIN STRONG INDEFINITELY INTO THE FUTURE:

-- ONE IS THE CONTINUED ALLIED PRESENCE AND RESOLVE, WHICH PROVIDES SECURITY FOR THE CITY AND AVOIDS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CLIMATE IN WHICH BERLINERS WOULD PERCEIVE A NEED FOR SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE EAST.

-- THE OTHER IS BERLIN'S TIES TO THE FRG AND TO THE WESTERN WORLD, WHICH ARE THE ESSENTIAL AND IRREPLACEABLE UNDERPINNING OF THE CITY'S PSYCHOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL WELL BEING.

THE FRG LOOKS TO THE THREE ALLIES TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF THE CITY, AS THE SINE QUA NON FOR THE FRG'S OWN ABILITY TO ASSURE BERLIN'S VIABILITY. CONVERSELY, THE ALLIES LOOK TO THE FRG TO CARRY OUT THE LATTER TASK IN A WAY WHICH WILL NOT WEAKEN OR COMPLICATE THEIR LEGAL AND POLITICAL ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE FORMER.

IT WILL THUS REMAIN A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY FOR ALL FOUR GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES ON POLICIES WHICH WILL BOTH ENCOURAGE THE EAST TO IMPLEMENT THE QA FULLY AND BRING FURTHER REAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE SITUATION OF BERLIN AND ITS

RESIDENTS. END TEXT.
HILLENBRAND

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